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Abstract.  Since the work  of Pollak and Wales (1979),  it is well-known that  de- 
mand  data  are insufficient to  identify a  household  cost  function.  Hence  addi- 
tional information is required. For that purpose I propose to employ direct mea- 
surement  of feelings of well-being, elicited in surveys. 
In the paper I  formally establish the connection between subjective measures 
and the cost function underlying the AID system. The subjective measures fully 
identify cost  functions  and  the  expenditure  data  do  this  partly.  This  makes  it 
possible to test the null hypothesis that both types of data are consistent with one 
another, i.e. that they measure the same thing.  I  use two separate data sets to set 
up a  test of this equivalence. The outcomes are somewhat mixed and indicate the 
need for further specification search. Finally, I  discuss some implications of the 
outcomes. 
1  Introduction 
Household cost functions  (and equivalence scales) can have many purposes and 
many underlying assumptions, as for instance stressed by Browning (1993).  (See 
also Nelson (1993) for a  historical and philosophical account.) In this paper I am 
concerned with the question how household cost functions depend on the com- 
position of a  household. Traditionally, a  question like this is answered by the in- 
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corporation of demographic factors in demand systems. As has been argued by 
Pollak and Wales (1979) one cannot fully identify household cost functions from 
demand data alone. Although this is not a problem in all cases, e.g. if one only 
wants to use a  household cost function as a  representation of preferences from 
which to derive demand equations, it does pose problems if one wants to use cost 
functions in applied welfare analysis. 
The most obvious solution to an identification problem is to invoke additional 
information. It can be argued that, rather than employing data on consumption 
expenditures, a household's cost function can also be measured, and with less ef- 
fort,  by  asking  respondents  to  a  survey  subjective  questions  about  money 
amounts needed to attain a certain welfare level. This approach has been adopted 
by a limited number of authors including Kapteyn and Van Praag (1976), Kapteyn 
et  al.  (1988),  Hagenaars  (1986),  Van  Praag  and  Van  der  Sar  (1988),  Dubnoff 
(1979), Vaughan  (1984),  Danziger et al.  (1984),  Colasanto et al.  (1984),  De Vos 
and Garner (1991). Although in my opinion this direct measurement has proven 
to work very well and to yield sensible results, it is fair to say that the profession 
of economists has generally ignored the direct approach. 
I  am not entirely sure why this is.  On the basis  of my own discussions with 
other economists (including discussants at conferences and referees for journals) 
I would conjecture that most economists simply do not believe what people say. 
They feel that the questions asked to respondents are too difficult or abstract to 
yield sensible answers.  Hence they cannot believe that what people say reflects 
preferences in the same way that observed choice behavior does. And if responses 
to questions do not measure the same thing as observed behavior then direct mea- 
surement becomes irrelevant for empirical economics. This impression is proba- 
bly reinforced by the feeling that  direct measurement yields results that appear 
different  than  outcomes  obtained  through  demand  analysis  (which  I  will 
henceforth refer to as indirect measurement or the revealed preference approach). 
The purpose of this paper is to formally test whether direct and indirect mea- 
surement of cost functions are equivalent, i.e. whether the two approaches mea- 
sure the same concept. This is important for various reasons.  In the first place 
direct measurement is much simpler than indirect measurement and hence more 
cost effective. So if we can accept the hypothesis that both modes of measurement 
measure the same thing, empirical analysis may be greatly facilitated. Secondly, 
the direct approach does not suffer from the same identification problem as the 
indirect approach. Hence if we can accept equivalence, we also solve a fundamen- 
tal problem that has been bugging applied welfare analysis. In the third place, as 
will become clear below, combination of indirect and direct approaches yields new 
possibilities for the detection of misspecification in empirical models and solu- 
tion of the ensuing problems. 
For a  start,  I will present an example in Sect. 2 illustrating the identification 
problem inherent in the revealed preference approach. In Sect. 3 I will provide a 
brief discussion of the informational requirements for identification. In Sect. 4 I 
will introduce the cost function of the Almost Ideal Demand System, which will 
serve as the main vehicle for setting up an empirical test. There I also discuss in- 
direct measurement.  In Sect. 5 direct measurement of the same cost function is 
described. In Sects. 6 and 7 I  develop the (simple) econometric framework that 
will allow for a test of equivalence of direct and indirect measurement. In Sect. 8 
the outcomes of the test are presented. A  discussion of the results and their im- 
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2  Underidentification  of cost functions;  an example 
Consider  the  following two utility functions: 
k 
U(q,f)  =  I]  (qi-aY  '  (2.1) 
i=1 
k 
U*(q,f) =  ~  //iln (qi-ai)+e'f  (2.2) 
i=1 
where  q: =  k-vector  of  goods,  f: =vector  of  household  characteristics, 
ai, fli:  =  parameters,  which  may depend on f,  e: =  parameter vector. 
Maximization of either of these functions with respect to q,  subject to a  linear 
budget constraint yields the following demand  functions: 
(--k  °,)  Piqi = Piai+ fli  pj  ,  i=  1  .....  k 
1 
(2.3) 
where Pi: =  prices,  i =  1  .....  k; x: =  total expenditures. 
The reason why the utility functions  U and U* yield the same demand functions 
is obvious.  U* is equal to the log of U plus a  constant fl'f.  Hence, if U reaches 
a  maximum,  so does  U*. 
By substituting the demand equations into the utility function we can easily 
derive the cost functions  associated with  U  and  U*.  They are,  respectively: 
c(u,p,f)  = u"  1-I  Pi  +  ~  Piai  (2.4) 
i=1  I~,~//J  i=1 
c*(u*,p,f) = e u*.  1-I  pi  /=l  t,,~//)  "e-~'i +,=1  ~ piai  (2.5) 
If demand data are available one can estimate all parameters in the demand equa- 
tion (2.3).  If these parameters depend on household characteristics then the pa- 
rameters appearing in the relation between the demand parameters and household 
characteristics can be estimated as well. As indicated above, I will refer to this way 
of measurement of cost function parameters as indirect measurement or revealed 
preference measurement.  Clearly, the parameter vector e in (2.5) cannot be iden- 
tified from the demand equation, because e does not appear in the demand equa- 
tion.  Nor is it possible to tell wether c or c* is the correct cost function. 
Although  I  have chosen to illustrate the identification problem by means of 
an example, it should be clear that the problem is perfectly general. Demand data 
alone can never identify a  household  cost function  completely. 336 
3  Informational requirements 
A. Kapteyn 
The fact that demand data are not sufficient to identify a cost function complete- 
ly was  first noted  by Pollak  and  Wales  (1979),  and  later reiterated by Lewbel 
(1989),  Fisher (1987),  Blackorby and  Donaldson  (1988),  Pashardes  (1992),  and 
others.  Whenever  one  faces  an  identification  problem,  there  are  three  basic 
choices. The first is to accept the problem and to try and live with it. This includes 
an  attempt  to  see  what  can  still  be  salvaged  from the  wreckage.  The  second 
approach is to make arbitrary assumptions that (seemingly) make the problem go 
away.  The  third  approach  is  to  invoke  additional  information.  I  will  briefly 
discuss  these  three  approaches  in  the  present  context,  borrowing  freely from 
Blundell and Lewbel (1991). 
•  Trying  to  live  with  it.  Blundell and  Lewbel (1991) prove a  beautiful lemma 
which says that within a given price regime any equivalence scale (i.e. the cost 
of living of one household relative to another) is consistent with observed de- 
mand.  That is,  equivalence scales  are  not  identified.  At the  same  time the 
evolution of these equivalence scales with changes in the price regime is fully 
identified.  One can paraphrase this by saying that we can fully identify the 
changes in something that we cannot see.  I  doubt if there are many contexts 
in which such information is useful. A  referee makes the following comment 
about this:  "I am more positive about the Blundell-Lewbel result on updating 
equivalence scales than the author. It seems to me that the result is useful once 
we agree on a scale in the base year. Essentially it formalises the obvious point 
that whatever the scale, it should increase if the price of milk increases"  Of 
course this is true, but it appears to me that the main problem remains to agree 
on a  scale in the base year. 
•  Arbitrary  assumptions.  If no  extra information is  invoked (see below),  any 
assumption  that  solves the identification problem is by definition arbitrary. 
Many  assumptions  have  been  made  in  the  literature  either  implicitly  or 
explicitly.  A  popular  assumption  has  been  the  Independence  of Base  (IB) 
assumption (or equivalence scale exactness, as it is denoted by Blackorby and 
Donaldson  1988),  which  stipulates  that  the ratio  of cost functions  for two 
households is independent of the level of utility at which the cost functions 
are evaluated. Although IB places testable restrictions on observable demands, 
acceptance of these restrictions does not solve the identification problem com- 
pletely. This can be illustrated by the L. E. S. example in the previous section. 
IB implies for both (2.4) and (2.5) that the parameters a i have to be equal to 
zero.  One can  see immediately from (2.3) that  this  is  a  testable hypothesis. 
However, if this hypothesis is accepted by the data, and if we are therefore will- 
ing  to  maintain  that  the  parameters  a i  are  zero,  this  does  not  imply that 
equivalence scales can be identified. There is still no way to choose between 
(2.4) and (2.5). We have to make the additional, untestable,  assumption that 
all monotonic transformations  of u  that are allowed in (2.4) do not involve 
household composition. In other words, in (2.5) the vector e has to be iden- 
tically equal to zero.  Clearly in that  case (2.4)  and  (2.5) will yield identical 
equivalence scales. 
So, acceptance of IB does not solve our problems. On the other hand,  if 
IB is rejected then even the additional  assumption  that  u  is uniquely deter- 
mined  up to monotonic transformations  not  involving household composi- The measurement of household cost functions  337 
tion, does not determine equivalence scales uniquely. It is worthwhile therefore 
to note that tests of IB by Blundell and Lewbel (1991) and by Pashardes (1992) 
indicate  sound rejection. 
One  can also  formulate IB,  or exactness,  in terms of differences  of cost 
functions rather than ratios (Blackorby and Donaldson 1993). In that case the 
difference between cost functions of different households  should not depend 
on utility.  In the L. E.S.  example one can see that IB in this  sense will hold 
for (2.4) if the Hi do not depend on household composition. The difference in 
cost of two households  h  and r  say is then simply: 
k 
Pi(aih-air)  ,  (3.1) 
i=1 
where  the  subscripts  h  and  r  indicate  dependence  of the parameters  on the 
composition of the households  h  and r. This outcome remains unaffected if 
we allow transformations of u not involving household composition. In other 
words  in  (2.5)  the  vector e  has  to  be identically  equal  to zero.  I  ignore the 
pathological case that all fli are zero. In that case the utility function is a con- 
stant. 
The IB assumption is by no means the only assumption that can be made 
to avoid the identification problem. But all assumptions have in common that 
they are arbitrary if we do not invoke additional  information. 
•  Additional information.  Blundell and Lewbel mention two types of additional 
information one could conceive of. The first type is to have observations on 
revealed preference for household  compositions. Although  one can conceive 
of such an approach in principle, it certainly stretches one's imagination as to 
how this would have to be implemented in practice. The other possibility they 
mention is the use of direct questions  on household cost functions. And that 
is the approach I  want to pursue in the rest of this paper. 
4  The cost function  of the Almost Ideal Demand system 
For concreteness the rest of the analysis will be done for a specific choice of func- 
tional  form.  Consider  the  formula  for  a  PIGLOG cost  function  (Muellbauer 
1975): 
In (c(u,p)) = a(p) +b (p) u  ,  (4.1) 
where p  is a vector of prices and a(p) and b(p) are functions of prices. Further- 
more,  let us  specialize the  PIGLOG formulation to the Almost  Ideal Demand 
specification of Deaton and Muellbauer  (1980)  and define 
a(p) = ao+ ~  akln(Pk)+ 1  k  2  ~k  ~/  Ykl In (Pk) In (Pt)  (4.2) 
b(p) = fl0 II p~k  ,  (4.3) 
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where the parameters ak, Ykt, fik have to satisfy well-known homogeneity restric- 
tions.  This gives rise to demand equations  of the form: 
w i =  ai+  ~  yi)ln (Pj)+fli  [ln (x)-a(p)]  , 
J 
(4.4) 
where w i is the budget share of the i-th commodity, i =  1  ....  , I; x  is total expen- 
ditures.  The parameters in the demand system, and hence the parameters of the 
cost function,  can be estimated if one has data available on the consumption of 
households  under a  sufficiently rich variation in prices. That is, in this way the 
parameters are measured indirectly,  as defined in  Sect. 2. 
Clearly, for the cost function (4.1) to satisfy IB in a relative form the parame- 
ters in b(p) should not depend on household composition. This is a testable pro- 
position.  If IB is satisfied,  equivalence scales would be identified  from demand 
data if furthermore u would be determined up to monotonic transformations not 
depending on household composition. And,  as with the L.E.S.  example, there is 
no way of knowing whether this is true without additional information.  It is to 
such additional  information that I  now turn. 
5  Direct  measurement 
In  the  literature  around  the  so-called  individual  welfare  function  of  income 
(WFI), spawned by Van Praag (1968), much of the empirical analysis is based on 
the answers to the  following question: 
Which after tax income would you in your circumstances consider to be very bad? 
And  bad?  Insufficient?  Sufficient?  Good?  Very  good?  (We  mean  after  tax 
househoM  income) 
very bad  $ -- 
bad  $ -- 
insufficient  $- 
sufficient  $ -- 
good  $ -- 
very good  S-- 
If one accepts the verbal qualifications "good", "sufficient", "bad", etc. as indica- 
tions of utility levels the IEQ measures a cost function directly.  For, the answers 
then provide for each of the utility levels the amount of money required to attain 
that utility level. Since the preamble states that answers have to be given "in your 
circumstances" the cost function is measured conditional on these circumstances. 
There is of course some ambiguity as to what these circumstances are, but  one 
would  expect family composition to be one of them. 
In the WFI-literature a  specific functional  form for the cost function is as- 
sumed, corresponding to an indirect utility function that has a  lognormal shape 
A (.;p, a).  To measure the parameters p  and a  of the tognormal utility function 
for a  given respondent it is commonly assumed that the verbal qualifications in 
the IEQ can be transformed into numbers,  say ei, i =  1  .....  6,  between zero and 
one.  These  numbers  partition  the  [0,1]  interval  in  equal  intervals,  i.e.  e i = 
(2i-1)/12.  In  other  words,  the  label  "very bad"  is  associated  with  e~ =  1/12, The measurement of household cost functions  339 
the label "bad" with e2 =  3/12,  etc. If we denote the answers given by a respon- 
dent by zi,  i =  1  ....  6,  then by assumption the answers  satisfy approximately 
N(ln(zi);/A,a)  = N  (ln (z-~-/A;0, 1)=ei,  i=  1,...,6.  (5.1) 
This implies that approximately, 
ln(zi)-/A-N-l(ei;O,  1 )  ,  i=1 ..... 6  .  (5.2) 
o" 
Adding  an  error  term  to  allow  for  measurement  and  rounding  errors  in  the 
answers of a respondent, the parameters/A and a  of an individual can now be esti- 
mated by the following regression: 
In (zi)  =/A-t- aN  1 (el; O, 1) +  gi  •  (5.3) 
Further details are for instance given in Van Praag (1971) and Van Praag and Kap- 
teyn (1973). Since this mode of measurement was introduced, various tests of the 
underlying  assumptions  have  been  carried  out,  including  the  equal  interval 
assumption and lognormality (see, e.g., Antonides et al.  1980;  Van Herwaarden 
and Kapteyn 1981; Buyze 1982; Van Praag 1991). The outcomes of these tests are 
not uniformly supportive of the underlying assumptions,  but they indicate their 
approximate validity. 
Since by assumption N-l(ei;O,  1) is nothing else than a  positive monotonic 
transformation of a utility level, and since there is no presumption that/A and a 
do not depend on prices, we might as well write (5.3) as 
in (zi)  = tt (p) + a(p) ui + ei  ,  (5.4) 
where u i = N  -1 (ei; O, 1).  Comparing this to the PIGLOG cost function given by 
(4.1), suggests that the IEQ may be seen to measure a PIGLOG cost function by 
means of direct questions rather than through observation of behavior. 
Similarly the analogy of (4.1) and (5.4) suggests that 
/A(p) = a0+ ~  akln(pk)+~ ~  ~  ?~klln (Pk) In (Pl) 
k  k  l 
(5.5) 
a(p) = fl0 I-[ P~k  k •  (5.6) 
k 
Since p  and a  can be measured per individual, one could estimate the parameters 
on the right hand side of (5.5) and (5.6) by regressing/A and a  on the functions 
of prices on the right hand side of (5.5) and (5.6).  So this then amounts to the 
direct  measurement  of the parameters of the AID cost function. 
So we now have two ways to measure the parameters of the AIDS,  namely 
through the observation of demand (i.e. through revealed preference) or through 
direct measurement. It is this fact that allows us to test in principle whether the 
direct measurement and the revealed preference approach measure the same thing. 340 
6  Econometric implications 
A. Kapteyn 
There are at least two reasons why testing for the equivalence of the direct and 
the  indirect  approach  is  less  straightforward  than  a  comparison  of (4.4)  and 
(5.5)-(5.6) would suggest.  The first reason is that the models are not complete; 
most likely preferences vary across households. In the present set-up I ignore the 
possibility that households are not homogeneous decision making units.  Thus I 
assume that both observed consumption behavior and answers to the IEQ either 
reflect household preferences or the preferences of the dictator in the household. 
Neglect of such variation may bias the test. A  second reason is that no data sets 
exist that permit both the estimation of the demand system and the measurement 
of WFIs. 
Turning to the first problem, I assume that the following simple equation pro- 
vides  a  sufficiently accurate  description  of the  variation  of preferences across 
households. 
°tO, n = rio + O'fn + ~n  ,  (6.1) 
where n  now indexes the household, a0,n is simply a0 as occurring in (4.2), but 
with an index n to indicate that it may vary across households, fi0 and fi are pa- 
rameters, fn is  a  vector of household characteristics  for household n;  ~n repre- 
sents all other factors that may influence the household's preferences. These fac- 
tors may include reference group effects, habit formation, random effects, etc. In 
itself this modelling of preference variation may be far too restrictive to be ade- 
quate.  In the concluding section I  return to this issue. 
Let us rewrite (4.4) by indexing all variables by n and adding an i.i.d, error term 
Uni, and by replacing a(p)  by an(P ),  where an(P) is defined according to (4.2), 
but with a 0 replaced by ao, n.  So we obtain: 
Wni = ai+  ~  yijln (Pnj)+13i[ln (xn)-an(p)l+uni • 
] 
(6.2) 
Similarly, we replace (5.5) by 
1 
/an=ao, n+  ~  akln(pnk)+ 2  ~  ~  yklln(Pnk)ln(pnt)+vn=an(p)+vn  (6.3) 
k  k  / 
with vn  an error term, representing for instance measurement error in Pn- 
It is worth commenting on the effect of the variable ~n implicit in an (P). First 
of all we should note that if ~n is not fully specified this introduces bias in the 
estimates of the parameters of the two equations  above, unless we could claim 
that the omitted factors do not correlate with the included explanatory variables. 
In general the bias will be different in the two equations and hence the direct and 
the indirect approach to measurement of cost functions yield different outcomes. 
The only way to avoid the omitted variable bias is to have a complete specification 
of all factors influencing preferences. With respect to the explanation of variation 
in the welfare parameters p  and a  across households numerous papers have been 
written  documenting these various  influences (see,  e.g.,  Kapteyn et al.  1985  or 
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less voluminous, but also here the evidence points at significant effects. See, e.g., 
Alessie and Kapteyn (1991) for evidence that in the AID system demographic ef- 
fects, habit formation, and reference group effects all play a role. This evidence 
also suggests that ~ will be correlated with most if not all explanatory variables 
in a demand system like (4.4). This strengthens the observation that omission of 
relevant factors will bias estimates. 
So how can we devise a test of the equivalence of direct and indirect measure- 
ment  that  is  not  affected by this  omitted variable  bias?  Note  that  under  the 
adopted  formulation the  null  hypothesis of equivalence of direct and  indirect 
measurement implies that 
Wni'4-•i]'ln  ":-- ai+  2  yijln (p~j)+/?iln (Xn)'4-blni-t-t~iU  n  . 
J 
(6.4) 
A  test of the null can now take the form of adding fn  and bilinear functions of 
log-prices to the right hand side of (6.4) and testing for significance of their coef- 
ficients. For later treatment it is useful to consider a particular alternative hypoth- 
esis,  namely that the equation for Pn reads 
~/n =  0~*  0,,+  2  a~ln(p,k)+~  2  2  yf~tln(p,k)ln(p,/)+v, 
k  k  l 
and 
(6.5) 
a*  =  ~+g*'fn+~n  0,n  (6.6) 
In other words, the functional form is the same as under the null, but the parame- 
ters are different. This leads to 
wni+ fli~tn = ai+ fli(O'~ -60)+  ~  [~ij+ fli(af  -  aj)] In (pnj)+/?i In (Xn) 
J 
+ fli(a*- a)'fn + ~ fli  ~  ~  (Yf~l- Ykt) In (Pnk) In (Pnl) 
k  l 
+ u~i + fli vn  •  (6.7) 
In obvious notation this can be written with  "reduced form coefficients" as 
Wni A-7~4,  i~ln -= 7r0,  i-}- 2  711,ij  In (p,j)+ 7[ if, +  ~  ~  n3,kt In (P,k) In (Pnz) 
j  k  l 
+  714,i In (xn)+u,,i+ 7[4,iUn  •  (6.8) 
Under the null, we have that n2 = 0 and 713,kl = 0.  So if data on all variables in 
(6.8) were available, we could simply run a  regression and apply F- or t-tests to 
test the null. Since, as mentioned above, no single data set is available containing 
all variables in (6.8) we have to combine different samples. 342 
7  Combining samples 
A. Kapteyn 
Two datasets are available. The first one is a consumer expenditure panel which 
has run from April 1984 through September 1987.  (This is the so-called Intomart 
consumer index;  the data used here were prepared by Pim Adang.)  This panel 
allows  for the  estimation  of a  demand  system,  including  demographics,  using 
monthly observations, but does not allow for the measurement of WFIs. The sec- 
ond dataset is a household panel measuring income, labor market status, demo- 
graphics,  and  the  like.  (This  is  the  so-called  socio-economic panel  run  by the 
Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. In this paper I use an extract from the 
data constructed by Alessie et al. 1992.) Also, WFIs are measured. The interviews 
have taken place in October 1984, October 1985 and October 1986. I will refer to 
the first panel as the CEP (consumer expenditure panel) and to the second panel 
as the SEP (socio-economic panel). 
In the empirical work I  shall consider only two goods,  "food" and  "other". 
Monthly price indices can be constructed from official statistics.  In view of the 
fact that only two commodities are considered and given the homogeneity restric- 
tions on coefficients in the AID system, only the relative price index of "food" 
relative to "other" enters the demand system. Also, we only have to consider one 
equation from the system, as the other follows from adding up.  This allows us 
to drop the subscript i and to write (6.8) as 
Wnq-n4,l.ln =  7r0q-n I ln(Pn)+n'zfn+n3[ln(Pn)lZ+n41n(xn)+Un+n4vn  .  (7.1) 
In the estimation of Eq.  (7.1) I  follow the recent literature on the combination 
of samples (see, e.g., Arellano and Meghir 1991; Angrist and Krueger 1992; Lusar- 
di  1993).  Simplify Eq.  (7.1) even further by writing it in matrix format as 
w+/tTr  4 =  XIO+Xzn4+e  ,  (7.2) 
where X 1 is a matrix containing a  column of ones plus the observations on the 
first three variables on the right hand side of (7.1) and X 2 is a vector containing 
the observations on log-expenditures. The parameter vector 0 is  defined as  0 = 
(n0, ~i, n~, n3)'. 
If all variables were observed for all households,  and if Z were a  matrix of 
valid instruments one would typically estimate the parameters of interest by con- 
structing the vector 
Z' (w+//7r 4 -X 10 -X2 n4)  (7.3) 
and minimizing its length with respect to /z  4 and 0 in some appropriate metric. 
Note that total expenditures are probably not statistically exogenous, and hence 
instrumental variable estimation is required. 
The elements of )(1  are observed for both samples,  but the elements of )(2 
and w are only observed for the CEP, whereas the elements of/z are only observed 
for the SEP. Let Z c be a matrix of instruments observed for the CEP sample and 
let Z s contain observations on the same instruments for the SEP sample. If both 
samples can be considered to be drawings from the same population then consis- The measurement of household cost functions  343 
tent estimation of the parameters can take place by minimizing the length of the 
following vector: 
)v  O-!  __1 Z'e w+ l--Z'sBlr4  -  Z'X1  ZeX2clr4 
Nc  gs  Nc 
(7.4) 
where Z without subscript and X 1 stands for the matrix of instruments and vari- 
ables for both samples combined. N c is the number of observations in the CEP 
and N s is the number of observations in the SEP, N  = Nc+N  s. The minimization 
problem can be solved in a very simple way. This can be seen as follows. Define 
NsN/2  )'  Z  \N  c~Nw',O'l'./]  /'N X'  -  and the vector  =  Then  we  can  the vector y  =  k~_  2c 
rewrite the above vector as follows: 
1 
-- Zt (z-S  1 0-y  7't'4)  ,  (7.5) 
N 
which we recognize as the vector that would be minimized if we would estimate 
the  following model by instrumental  variables: 
1  1  1 
--Z :  --Xl  0 + --y ~4 q- error  .  (7.6) 
N  N  N 
The only thing that remains to be done for efficient estimation is to derive the 
asymptotic variance covariance matrix of the error. This is done in the Appendix. 
With this  covariance matrix in hand  one can apply generalized least squares. 
8  Empirical  results 
For 91  households  in the CEP observations are available for all 42 months that 
the  panel has been in  existence.  Thus  we have 3822  observations in total.  The 
balanced  panel  extracted  from the  SEP  has  1328  households.  This  number  is 
much lower than  would  be possible,  since  the  SEP  covers approximately 5000 
households.  However in Alessie  et  al.  (1992)  a  severe selection has been made, 
since extensive information on households' reference groups had to be available. 
For simplicity I have not tried to construct a bigger sample. Since three waves are 
used in the empirical analysis, we have 3984 observations. At first sight, issues of 
selectivity  and  individual  and  time  effects  would  appear  to  complicate  the 
analysis. However, to the extent that these effects would only affect the distribu- 
tion of (n in (6.1) the set-up of model (6.4) essentially wipes out all such effects. 
I return to this in the next section.  Hence we use the observations as if they are 
independent,  conditional  on the exogenous variables in the model. 
Only  a  limited  number  of variables  can  be  used  as  instruments,  since  the 
definition of variables across samples appears to differ widely. It turns out that 
only degree of urbanization  and  province of residence  are  defined  in identical 
ways for the two samples. For the rest I consider prices and household composi- 
tion  as  exogenous,  so  these  yield  valid  instruments  as  well.  The  influence  of 344  A.  Kapteyn 
household composition has been modelled in an extremely simple way, namely as 
the log of the number of family members. This may appear too primitive, but it 
does not bias the test under the null. For, any misspecification in the modelling 
of the influence of family composition will  be  absorbed  by the variable  ~n  in 
(6.1), which does not appear in the test. 
In Table I  I present four sets of results. In the first column the results of esti- 
mating a food share equation analogous to (6.2) are presented. In the second col- 
umn estimates are given obtained by estimating Eq. (7.6) by OLS. In the third and 
fourth  column  I  present  the  estimates  obtained  by the  IV  approach  outlined 
above. The difference between the latter two columns lies in the definition of in- 
struments.  In the third column urbanization degree has been defined as a  set of 
six binary variables with province a variable with domain 1  .....  11. In the fourth 
column urbanization degree has been defined identically, but province has now 
been defined as a set of eleven binary variables. Although both definitions of in- 
struments would appear to be valid choices, one would expect the latter set of in- 
struments  to be superior in terms  of the asymptotic efficiency of the resulting 
estimators. 
Recently a number of authors have pointed at the danger of using weakly cor- 
related  instruments,  because  the  usual  asymptotic  theory  can  be  severely 
misleading  (e.g.  Bound et al.  1993;  Staiger and  Stock 1993;  Bekker  1994).  One 
way of looking at this is to consider the R 2 of the regression of the potentially 
endogenous variable on the instruments (in our case y in Eq. (7.6), i.e. the vector 
containing the values of log-expenditures and p).  For column 3 this R2 equals 
0.10, whereas for column 4 we obtain 0.13. These values seem to be sufficiently 
high to allow for the application of standard asymptotic theory. 
In view of the purpose of this paper, the most striking aspect of Table 1 is that 
the variable In (fs), which is highly significant in the food share equation and also 
comes out highly significant when estimating (7.6) with OLS becomes totally in- 
significant when estimating the model by means of IV,  as in the third column. 
Table 1.  Estimates for three specifications 
Variable  Food share  Two samples OLS  Two samples IV1  Two samples IV2 
In (p)  -0.829  -  1.94  -4.91  -2.51 
s.e.  0.390  0.508  0.815  0.694 
t  -  2.12  -  3.88  -  6.03  -  3.62 
In (fs)  0.069  0.031  0.003  0.026 
s.e.  0.006  0.004  0.007  0.005 
t  11.1  7.710  0.359  5.73 
In  z (p)  -  20.3  -  51.2  -  120  -  62.9 
s.e.  7.83  11.9  19.0  17.4 
t  -2.59  -4.35  -  6.32  -  3.62 
In (x)/p  -  0.084  0.010  0.007  0.010 
s.e.  0.013  0.00008  0.0006  0.006 
t  -  6.36  120  12.5  15.8 
Constant  1.22  0.22  0.228  0.215 
s.e.  0.159  0.005  0.006  0.004 
t  7.73  40.7  37.5  48.1 
R 2  0.36  0.665 
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In the fourth column however, with the use of the more efficient instruments, the 
coefficient of In (fs) is once again highly significant though smaller in absolute 
value than with OLS. 
It should be noted furthermore that the variable lnZ(p) remains significant in 
both  IV-columns,  whereas  according to  (6.4)  this  variable  should  become in- 
significant as well. Although this is at variance with the null as formulated so far, 
it is easy to think of a cost function which would be compatible with a significant 
lnZ(p) variable. That would still be a PIGLOG cost function but with a function 
a(p)  defined  as  a  cubic  polynomial  in  log-prices  rather  than  as  a  quadratic 
(cf. (4.2)): 
a(p) = ao+ ~  akln (Pk)+~ ~  ~  yktln(p~)ln(pt) 
k  k  l 
1 
+-- 2  2  ~  ~Oklm  In (Pk) in (Pl) In (Pm)  •  (8.1) 
3  k  l  m 
This  cost  function  would  also  imply the  presence  of ln3(p)  in  the  foodshare 
equation. I  have estimated the foodshare equation as in column one of Table 1, 
but  with  ln3(p)  included.  It  turns  out  that  the  fit  of the  equation  does  not 
change.  The reason for this is  simply that in the present data set the variables 
In (p),  In  2 (p)  and In  3 (p)  are highly collinear:  A  regression of In  3 (p)  on In (p) 
and in  2 (p) yields an R 2 equal to 0.994.  In fact the fit of the foodshare equation 
is  identical whether we include In (p) and In  2 (p) or In (p) and In  3 (/9). 
I  have  also  performed  a  test  of  overidentification  of the  instruments  by 
regressing the residuals  of the estimated equations according to columns 3 and 
4 on the instruments used. We can use N  times the R 2 of this regression as a test 
statistic for the null that the instruments province and urbanization degree should 
not enter (7.6) directly. The test statistic should follow a Z 2 distribution with l-k 
degrees of freedom where l is the number of instruments  and k  the number of 
explanatory variables in the model (see e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). For 
both  columns  3  and  4  the  null  is  soundly  rejected  (Z2(10)=30.4  and 
Z2(20) =  86.8 respectively). Next I have experimented with the inclusion of some 
instruments  directly. Although,  of course this  does reduce the value of the Z 2 
statistic the values of the coefficients in Table 1 remain essentially unchanged. 
Another point worth noting is that the estimate of fl (the coefficient of In (x) and 
tt respectively) is positive in all columns but the first. Since food is generally con- 
sidered  to  be  a  necessity fl  should  come  out  negative.  This  presents  another 
anomaly that points at misspecification. 
In sum, we find that we can formulate a specification of the cost function such 
that according to one set of instruments the null hypothesis that direct and in- 
direct measurement are equivalent would pass the test, whereas a different (more 
efficient) set of instruments yields the conclusion that the two modes of measure- 
ment are not equivalent, although the size of the coefficient of log-family size in 
column  four suggests  that  the  null hypothesis may be reasonably close to the 
truth. At the same time there are indications of misspecification in all cases. 346  A. Kapteyn 
9  Discussion 
The empirical analysis has been based on a rather simple model. This leads to two 
sorts  of considerations.  First of all,  under the null,  misspecification due to an 
overly simplistic set-up, e.g.  the representation of family composition merely by 
the log of family size,  is absorbed by the variable (n in (6.1) and hence should 
not bias the test of the null. 
A  second kind of consideration is that if the model chosen is too simplistic, 
then this  misspecification will  tend to be picked up  by variables  added to the 
model, even if these variables do not properly belong to the model. In other words 
one tends  to  obtain  too many significant variables.  Since my test is  based  on 
precisely the addition of variables to an equation that, under the null should not 
be there, the test would seem to be biased against the null. An example of a likely 
source of misspecification is the disregard of issues of selectivity and serial cor- 
relation;  to the extent that these enter the equations through the error term in 
(6.1), they are wiped out by the combination of (6.2) and (6.3) into (6.4). To the 
extent that selectivity and serial correlation affect the equations in a different way, 
one would expect the model (6.4) to be misspecified. This misspecification may 
then be picked up by the variable In (fs), and hence the test will be biased against 
the null. This would then explain the significant coefficient in the fourth column 
of Table 1. Yet another source of misspecification would occur if the functional 
form of the share equation for food were inadequate. Evidence provided by Banks 
et al.  0994) suggests that the AID share equation is sufficiently general to ade- 
quately describe the demand for food. 
Altogether then the evidence appears to be a bit mixed. Formally, the null is 
rejected,  but  the  estimated  coefficient of In (fs)  is  not  very large.  Given  the 
various sources of misspecification mentioned this is about what one would ex- 
pect if the null were true. Hence, although the issue of equivalence of direct and 
indirect measurement of cost functions has not been settled by the simple test I 
have proposed here, further research into the hypothesis seems justified. Among 
other things,  one may consider more complex specifications than (6.1). 
An important aspect of the test applied here is that it tries to deal with omitted 
variables. It is readily seen that omitted variables lead to different biases in a de- 
mand equation than in for instance (6.3). As noted in Sect. 6, this implies that 
equivalence scales  derived  from  demand  systems  will  be  different from  scales 
derived  from  subjective  measures.  These  differences  may  simply  point  to 
misspecification rather than to genuine differences between direct and indirect 
measurement. This is not to say that demand systems and subjective measures will 
only suffer from similar  sources  of misspecification.  In  Kapteyn et  al.  (1988) 
specific methodological issues in the application of subjective measures are being 
discussed.  Their correction method has been used to construct the values for 
in the current data set. 
One should also note that equivalence scales show enormous variation across 
studies based solely on demand data (Browning 1992). This variation itself may 
point to misspecification in the models considered, if only because the models 
cannot all be true at the same time. More importantly, since all equivalence scales 
based  on  demand  data  suffer  from  the  identification  problem  alluded  to  in 
Sect. 2, one may claim that the scales obtained by various authors are inherently 
arbitrary.  Recall the  Lemma proven by Blundell and  Lewbel (1991),  quoted in 
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Imagine that the null hypothesis put forward in this paper were accepted as 
being true, then this would have a number of consequences. First of all it would 
suggest that the particular representation of the utility function adopted here is 
adequate. Hence, if one were able to fully specify the AID system (with third order 
terms in log-prices, and not omitting relevant variables) equivalence scales could 
be estimated that  are not arbitrary.  Secondly, however, the outcomes then also 
validate the direct measurement approach. This approach requires much less data 
than a revealed preference approach. So, once again, if one is able to fully specify 
a model for/4 or better still a model for p  and a jointly, equivalence scales follow. 
Various attempts to specify such a complete model have been made (see, e.g., Kap- 
teyn 1977; Kapteyn et al. 1980; Kapteyn et al. 1985; Kapteyn and Wansbeek 1985). 
Since one can never be sure that a  model is fully specified, the joint use of 
direct measurement and revealed preference allows for tests of specification that 
would not otherwise exist. In certain cases one can use the two different measure- 
ments to solve misspecification problems in a similar vein as in general latent vari- 
ables models (see, e.g., Aigner et al.  1984). 
Fourthly, it opens up new possibilities for identification. For example, if data 
series on consumption by households are too short to estimate all parameters in 
a demand system the availability of subjective measures, like p, may help to iden- 
tify parameters. 
A  Appendix 
In order to obtain asymptotically efficient estimators of the parameters of interest 
(and hence a  powerful test of the null), the length of the vector 
1  1  ,  1  ,  --  ZcW.l_Zlts,l.lTr4___l  XlO---ZcX2cTr4  , 
g=Nc  Ns  N  N c 
(A.1) 
(cf.  7.4)  has  to be minimized in the  appropriate metric,  i.e.  the inverse of the 
asymptotic variance covariance matrix of the vector g, where for all parameters 
true  values  have  been  inserted.  An  asymptotically  equivalent  procedure  is  to 
replace true parameter values by consistent estimates. These consistent estimates 
are obtained by minimizing g  in the unit metric. 
The derivation of the asymptotic variance covariance matrix of g is straight- 
forward.  For a  start we assume that  observations in two  different samples  are 
mutually independent. We can write 
[1  ,  1  ,  1  ,  ] 
g=-- gc + gs =- I--  Zc W--- ZcXlcO--- ZcX2czral 
[N  o  N  N c  J 
q- [ Z  Zs~IT~4_L ZsXlsO ]  ,  (A.2) 
Lns  n  J 
in  obvious notation.  Deote the  asymptotic variance covariance matrices  of gc 
and gs by ~b  o and  q~s respectively. That is,  qsi, i = c.s is defined as the variance 
covariance matrix of the limiting distribution of ~  for  Ni--" oo.  Further- 
more, let Pi be the limit for N~ oo of Ni/N, i =  c, s. Let the asymptotic variance 348  A. Kapteyn 
covariance matrix ~  of g be defined analogously to those of gc and gs, but with 
N e or Ns replaced by N. Then the asymptotic variance covariance matrix of g is 
(1/Pc)~c+(1/Ps)q~s.  There is  no need to  derive  ~c and  ~b  s explicitly, one only 
needs to find consistent estimators that can be used in estimation. Define the vec- 
tors 
gci=Zci(Wci-~g~ciO-X'2ci~4)='Zcieci  (A.3) 
(A.4) 
where Zci is the i-th row of Zc, Xlei,X2ci, gsi, Xlsi  are  defined analogously. The 
"residuals" eci and esi are defined implicitly. Let the sample covariance matrices 
of gci and gsi be denoted as ~e and q3  s respectively. These are consistent estimates 
of q~c and  ~s.  The estimate of ~  is 
q3 =  N  q3c+N q3  s  .  (A.5) 
N~  Us 
In  finite samples  the variance covariance matrix of g  is then approximated by 
~,=  _i  ~  = _I  ~c+!  ~s" 
N  N c  N s 
Using the notation of Sect. 7, cf. (7.6), let  W= [XI,y],  0~ =  (0',~z4)'  then ~* 
is an estimate of the variance covariance of the error in the regression: 
1  1 
Z' z = --Z' Wq~+error  .  (A.6) 
N  N 
1 
Efficient estimation amounts to GLS in this equation.  Let  ~  zw = plim-- 
N 
Z' W. Then the asymptotic variance covariance matrix of the estimator of O~ is: 
avar (~) = (E 'zw q~-I E zw) -1  •  (A.7) 
In finite samples the variance covariance of the estimator of q~ is approximated by 
I  /  -1 
-1  1 Z'  1__ W'Z  1  ~c+l  ~s  --  (A.8) 
var (~) =  L N  \Nc  Ns  N 
Thus, the computation of the efficient IV estimates amounts to the following pro- 
cedure.  First  estimate Eq.  (7.6)  by  IV  assuming  a  scalar  variance  covariance 
matrix of the errors. Next form per observation the residual vector times the in- 
strument vector (cf. (A.3) and (A.4)). Multiply these by N c or N s, depending on 
which  subsample  the  observation belongs  to.  Compute  the  sample  covariance 
matrices  of these  vectors  per  subsample,  i.e.  compute  qfic and  q3  s.  Next  form 
q~* =  (l/N) ~fi, cf. (A.5). Use this result to perform GLS on (A.6), i.e. compute: The measurement of household cost functions  349 
qS----  W'Z~ -1  Z'  1W'Z~-l  lz'z  .  (1.9) 
N  N 
The variance covariance matrix of this estimator is then computed as 
var (0~) =  W' Z ~-  1 1_ Z'  (A.I 0) 
N 
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